

# Ratnākaraśānti on *Prakāśa* \*

Kei KATAOKA

## Summary

In his *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* (PPU) Ratnākaraśānti claims that all dharmas are mere cognition in nature (*viññānamātrasvabhāvāḥ*). This view is based on his theory of illumination (*prakāśa*, shining forth). He regards the illumination/appearance of all dharmas as possible only when illumination is accepted as their nature (*prakāśamānānām dharmāṇām ... ātmabhūtaḥ prakāśaḥ*). Only something luminous in nature can shine forth. An object, if it did not have the nature of being luminous, could not shine forth (*sa ced atadrūpo na tarhi prakāśate*). Thus, for him, luminous dharmas, which have the very nature of cognition, are precisely cognition in nature. Whereas Ratnākaraśānti regards illumination as cognition in nature, Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas regard it as an additional property produced in a cognized object (*viśayasya grāhyasya dharmāḥ*) as a result of a cognizing action (*jñānakārya*). Naiyāyikas, etc., regard it as nothing more than the occurrence of cognition (*jñānasyotpattiḥ*). They need no separate category called illumination. When a cognition of blue arises, blue appears to the mind. Another theorist, whom Ratnākaraśānti designates merely as *aparaḥ* (another), claims that a non-luminous object is illuminated by a luminous cognition (*arthaḥ punar atadrūpo jñānavaśāt prakāśate*). In other words, the illumination of objects is possible not because illumination is the nature of objects but because they are connected with the illumination of cognition, just as a pot is illuminated by the light of a lamp. Ratnākaraśānti refutes these three heretic views one by one. The

---

\* This article was read at the IABS conference in Toronto on Aug 25th, 2017. I thank Shoryu Katsura, Oki Kazufumi, Shinya Moriyama, and Suguru Ishimura for their comments. This work was supported by KAKENHI 15H03159 and 15K02043.

present paper aims at clarifying Ratnākaraśānti's arguments against these views.

## I. Structure of the text

In his *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* Ratnākaraśānti systematically discusses *prajñā* by dividing it into three phases: *śrutamayī prajñā*, *cintāmayī prajñā*, and *bhāvanāmayī prajñā*. The first two phases, i.e., *śrutamayī prajñā* and *cintāmayī prajñā*, are further divided into two subcategories according to their objects: *yāvadbhāvikatāyām* and *yathāyadbhāvikatāyām* for each. He explains the *prajñās* altogether in five sections as follows.

- (1) *yāvadbhāvikatāyām*
- (1-1) *śrutamayī prajñā*
- (1-2) *cintāmayī prajñā*
- (2) *yathāyadbhāvikatāyām*
- (2-1) *śrutamayī prajñā*
- (2-2) *cintāmayī prajñā***
- (3) *bhāvanāmayī prajñā*

In the section of *yathāyadbhāvikatāyām cintāmayī prajñā* (2-2 above), Ratnākaraśānti claims that all dharmas are devoid of *svabhāva* (*sarvadharmā niḥsvabhāvāḥ*) inasmuch as they lack *grāhya* and *grāhaka*, i.e., inasmuch as they are devoid of an object-subject-division, because they are mere cognition in nature (*viññānamātrasvabhāvāḥ*).<sup>(1)</sup> In order to defend this theory of *viññānamātra*, he further claims, on the basis of direct experience, that all dharmas that shine forth/appear have illumination (*prakāśa*) as their own nature (*ātmabhūtaḥ prakāśaḥ*).<sup>(2)</sup> As he explains, illumination (*prakāśa*), the property of being luminous (*prakāśamānatā*), showing (*prakhyāna*), appearing (*pratibhāsa*) are synonyms.<sup>(3)</sup> And this illumination is a form/appearance (*rūpa*) that is sentient (*ajāda*, not insentient), perceptible (*aparokṣa*), and clearly manifest (*parisphuṭa*).<sup>(4)</sup> Without illumination nothing can appear and therefore nothing can be established.<sup>(5)</sup> On the other hand, if one accepts illumination, i.e., the clear appearance of dharmas, one is led to the conclusion that all

(1) PPU: *evaṃ ca yato viññānamātrasvabhāvāḥ sarvadharmās tato grāhyeṇa grāhakeṇa ca svabhāvena virahān niḥsvabhāvāḥ*.

(2) PPU: *iha prakāśamānānām dharmāṇām anubhavasiddhas tv ātmabhūtaḥ prakāśaḥ*. Cf. PVin 1:38: *nānyo 'nubhāvyo buddhyāsti tasyā nānubhavo 'paraḥ/ grāhyagrāhakavidhuryāt svayaṃ saiva prakāśate//*.

(3) PPU: *prakāśaś ca prakāśamānatā prakhyānaṃ pratibhāsanam*.

(4) PPU: *sa khalv ajaḍam aparokṣaṃ parisphuṭaṃ rūpam*.

(5) PPU: *tadasiddhau cāprakāśamānasya kasyacid asiddheḥ sarvāsiddhiprasaṅgaḥ*.

dharmas are cognition in nature because illumination is precisely cognition.<sup>(6)</sup>

Thus, having clarified the Yogācāra's view of self-luminosity or the *sākāra* theory (that, in fact, is shared by the Sautrāntikas up to this point), Ratnākaraśānti then refutes brahmanical schools that hold the *nirākāra* theory, i.e., (Bhāṭṭa) Mīmāṃsakāḥ, Naiyāyikādayaḥ, and someone else whom he simply refers to as *aparaḥ*. In the following I explain his refutation of these three views of heretics not in due order (B-C-D) but in reverse order (D-C-B), because the last view is easier than the first for us.

### Synopsis of the entire PPU<sup>(7)</sup>

1. maṅgalam
2. trividhāḥ prajñāḥ: śrutacintābhāvanāmayyaḥ
3. śrutamayī prajñā (1)
4. cintāmayī prajñā (2)
5. dharmā dvābhyāṃ tattvākārābhyāṃ jñeyāḥ
  - 5.1. yāvadbhāvikatāyā yathāvadbhāvikatāyā ca
  - 5.2. yāvadbhāvikatāyāṃ śrutamayī prajñā (1-1)
  - 5.3. yāvadbhāvikatāyāṃ cintāmayī prajñā (1-2)
  - 5.4. yathāvadbhāvikatāyāṃ śrutamayī prajñā (2-1)
  - 5.5. yathāvadbhāvikatāyāṃ cintāmayī prajñā (2-2)
    - 5.5.1. vijñānamātrasvabhāvatvāt sarvadharmāṇāṃ niḥsvabhāvatvam
    - 5.5.2. sarvadharmāṇāṃ prakāśātmatā: jñānasākāratvasādhanam (A)
      - 5.5.2.1. mīmāṃsakamatadūṣaṇam (B)
      - 5.5.2.2. naiyāyikādimatadūṣaṇam (C)
      - 5.5.2.3. aparamatadūṣaṇam (D)
    - 5.5.3. sautrāntikamatadūṣaṇam: bāhyaṃ grāhyaṃ nāsti (E)
    - 5.5.4. yat prakāśate tad alīkam eva na vastu
      - 5.5.4.1. vaibhāṣīkatadūṣaṇam: aṣṭādaśadhātvdipratiṣedhaḥ (F)
      - 5.5.4.2. alīkaprakāśopapādanam

<sup>(6)</sup> PPU: *siddhau tad eva jñānam iti jñānasvabhāvāḥ sarvadharmāḥ siddhāḥ*. “Once [the manifest appearance, i.e., illumination, is] established, all dharmas are established as cognition in nature, because cognition is nothing other than that.” A Buddhist view is referred to by Śrīdhara in his *Nyāyakandalī* as follows. NK 319.7–320.3: *na ca jñānāt makatvam eva grāhyatvam. ... avabhāsamānatvam eva tasya grāhyatvam iti cet.*

<sup>(7)</sup> The Sanskrit titles are given by me with slight modifications in terms of the numbering. For a detailed look at the synopsis of the PPU, see Katsura's article in this volume.

5.5.4.3. sākārajñānavādimatanirāsaḥ (G)

5.5.5. svamatasādhanam

6. bhāvanāmayī prajñā (3)

## II. Other theories of *prakāśa*

### 1. The view of *aparaḥ* (D): A non-luminous object is illuminated by a luminous cognition (*\*prakāśarūpo 'rthaḥ prakāśarūpajñānavaśāt prakāśate*)

Cognition spontaneously shines forth because it has illumination as its own nature. An object, on the other hand, which does not have illumination as its own nature, is illuminated by cognition.<sup>(8)</sup> In other words, an object is illuminated, but does not spontaneously illuminate itself (*prakāśyate na ca prakāśate*).<sup>(9)</sup> This is the view ascribed by Ratnākaraśānti to *aparaḥ*. Most probably we can identify this *aparaḥ* as a Prābhākara.<sup>(10)</sup>

<sup>(8)</sup> PPU: *jñānaṃ prakāśarūpatvāt svayam eva prakāśate/ arthaḥ punar atadrūpo jñānavaśāt prakāśate// ity aparaḥ*. Cf. PrP 170.5: *sarvāś ca pratītyaḥ svayaṃ pratyakṣāḥ prakāśante*.

<sup>(9)</sup> Cf. PrP 143.14–15: *yac ca jaḍasya prakāśāyogād ity abhedakāraṇam uktam. tad apy ayuktam. jaḍasyaiva prakāśasambandho ghaṭate, tadātmakatā tu neśyata eva*. “‘Because an insentient thing cannot shine forth’ is stated as the reason for non-distinction [by Buddhists]; but this is not appropriate either. Rather, the relationship with illumination is possible only with an insentient thing; [its] having illumination as its nature is not acceptable at all.” Cf. also a similar argument at PrP 184.13–15.

<sup>(10)</sup> The view of the present opponent accords with the final view of the Prābhākaras. Whereas Bhaṭṭa Kumārila claims that cognition cannot directly perceive itself, Prābhākara accepts that cognition directly perceives itself, i.e., that one can be aware of awareness itself directly. For the Prābhākaras, three items are directly perceived, as the sentence “I cognize blue” shows. Cf. PrP 171.1: “*idam ahaṃ gṛhṇāmi*” *iti vā* “*idam ahaṃ smarāmi*” *iti vā tritayam evāvabhāśate*; ŚVK II 105.2–5: *pratīmo hi vāyam ekasyāṃ saṃvidi tritayam—pramātā pramītiḥ prameyaṃ ceti. ... nīlam ahaṃ jñānāmi*. Here, a self cognizes an object. All items, i.e., a soul (*ātman*), awareness itself (*saṃvid*), and an object such as blue, are cognized. Prābhākara further introduces a distinction between *saṃvid* and an object based on how they are cognized. Awareness is not cognized as an object of awareness (*saṃvedyatayā*) but only as an awareness (*saṃvittayā*). In other words, he distinguishes between *kriyā* (action) and *karman* (object) and thereby distinguishes awareness from an ordinary object such as blue. *Bṛhatī*: 82–83 (cf. ŚVK II 106.3–5): *na brūmah “na saṃvedyā saṃvit” iti. saṃvittayaiva hi saṃvit saṃvedyā, na saṃvedyatayā. keyaṃ vācoyuktiḥ “saṃvedyā na saṃvedyā” iti. iyaṃ iyaṃ vācoyuktiḥ “nāśyāḥ karmabhāvo vidyate” iti. karma ca saṃvedyābhīdheyam, na saṃvit. tasmān na pṛthak saṃvedyatayā grahītuṃ śakyate. na cāsaṃvedyāiva saṃvit, tanmūlatvāt sarvabhāvānāṃ saṃvedyābhāvasya*. “We do not claim that awareness cannot be cognized, because awareness can be cognized precisely as awareness but not as the object of awareness. [Q] What is this expression “to be cognized, but not to be cognized”? [A] This is an expression that means that awareness does not become an object. And [generally speaking], an object [of an awareness] and not the awareness itself is called *saṃvedya*, i.e., an object to be cognized. Therefore, [awareness] cannot be cognized separately as an object to be cognized. At the same time, it is not the case that awareness cannot be cognized at all, because the fact that all things can be objects of awareness

The most serious problem with this view, according to Ratnākaraśānti, is that an object, if it were not luminous in nature, could not shine forth (*\*aprakāśarūpo na prakāśate*).<sup>(11)</sup> In response to this, the opponent claims that an object, although itself non-luminous, can be illuminated due to some relationship (*saṃbandha*) with an illuminating cognition. Ratnākaraśānti, then, questions this relationship and asks: “By means of what kind of relationship is the object made known by a cognition?”<sup>(12)</sup> Ratnākaraśānti considers three theoretical possibilities and refutes each of them.

### 1.1. Because of being bound to the same causal aggregate (*ekasāmagrīpratibandhāt*)

The opponent claims that it is possible that an object is illuminated by a cognition because the object in question is bound to the same causal aggregate.<sup>(13)</sup> In other words, cognition targets a particular object because the object in question is included in the same causal aggregate.

However, Ratnākaraśānti points out, the faculty of sight (which is regarded as imperceptible) is also included in the same causal aggregate and therefore would be cognized by a visual cognition, which is absurd.<sup>(14)</sup>

### 1.2. Because it is an object (*viśayatvāt*)

The opponent rebuts this as follows: it is true that both a color and the faculty of sight are included in the same causal aggregate. But a color is an object (*viśaya*) whereas the faculty of sight is not.<sup>(15)</sup> Thus, the object-ness (*viśayatā*) of a color is the relationship that

---

is based on the fact [that awareness is cognized].” Ratnākaraśānti’s usage of *prakāśyate* echoes Prabhākara’s usage of *saṃvedya*, and his usage of *viśayatā* echoes *saṃvedyatā*, *saṃvedyabhāva* and *karmabhāva*.

Awareness as action:	<i>saṃvittayaiva saṃvit saṃvedyā, na saṃvedyatayā.</i>
Object of awareness:	<i>prakāśyate, na prakāśate.</i>

<sup>(11)</sup> PPU: *sa ced atadrūpo na tarhi prakāśate. “prakāśyate, na ca prakāśate” iti vyāhatam etat.*

<sup>(12)</sup> PPU: *kutaś ca saṃbandhād arthas tena vedyate.*

<sup>(13)</sup> PPU: *ekasāmagrīpratibandhād iti cet. Cf. JNĀ 421.15–16: ekasāmagrījanyatve tu jadānubhavayoḥ pratīnyatam vedyatvam vedakatvam ca syāt. tatpratibandhāc ca nātiprasaṅgaḥ.*

<sup>(14)</sup> PPU: *caḥsur api cakṣurvijñānena vedyeta. Cf. JNĀ 421.17: indriyeṇātivyāptir iti cet. Vācaspati’s Nyāyakaṇṭhikā ad 2.4 (Goswami ed., 181.31–182.2) ekasāmagrīpratibandhena vā vartamānaviśayatve netrādīnām api tadekasāmagrīniveśīnām vijñānakālānām grahaṇaprasaṅgaḥ.*

<sup>(15)</sup> PPU: *aviśayatvād iti cet. Cf. JNĀ 421.18–21: na, sāmagrīsāmarthyād eva nīlasyaiva vedyatvenotpatteḥ. ... vedyatvenotpattir na prakāśatvena.*

specifies the target of cognition.

However, Ratnākaraśānti points out, this object-ness presupposes the existence of illumination. In other words, a color becomes an object because it has illumination. Without illumination, a color cannot be an object. Ratnākaraśānti states: Even a color cannot be an object without illumination.<sup>(6)</sup>

### 1.3. Because of the connection with the illumination of cognition (*jñānaprakāśasaṃsargāt*)

The opponent further rebuts this as follows: it is true that without illumination a color is not an object and therefore is not illuminated by cognition. But once it has a connection (*saṃsarga*) with the illumination of cognition (i.e., a physical connection, either *saṃyoga*, *samavāya*, or a combination of these), it is cognized. In other words, a non-luminous object is illuminated due to the connection with the illumination of cognition, just as a pot is illuminated due to the connection with the light of a lamp.<sup>(7)</sup>

Ratnākaraśānti points out that this view does not work either, because in the case of fruit or a flower, for example, the illumination of cognition is connected not only with its color, but also with its smell and touch. Thus, it would undesirably follow that smell and touch are also made known by the faculty of sight because a connection exists similarly with them.<sup>(8)</sup>

Ratnākaraśānti concludes: Therefore, all objects, such as blue, which one is directly aware of are cognitions only, and not something external to cognition, i.e., something grasped by it.<sup>(9)</sup>

<sup>(6)</sup> PPU: *rūpasyāpy asati prakāśe kā viṣayatā*.

<sup>(7)</sup> PPU: *jñānaprakāśasaṃsargād arthaḥ prakāśate pradīpālokasaṃsargād ghaṭādivat—ity aparāḥ*. Cf. Śrīdhara also refers to the connection with illumination as a possible solution. NK 321.4–5: *na hi “jaḍasya prakāśasaṃsargeṇa na bhavitavyam” ity asti rājājñā*.

<sup>(8)</sup> PPU: *tasya [=arthasya] gandharasasparśā api cakṣurvijñānena vedyeran phalapuṣpādiṣu ... saṃsargāviśeṣāt*.

<sup>(9)</sup> PPU: *tasmāt saṃvedyamānaḥ sarvo nīlādir jñānam eva, na jñānabāhyas tadgrāhyo ’rthaḥ*.

## 2. The view of Naiyāyikādayaḥ (C): illumination is nothing but the occurrence of a cognition (*\*jñānasyotpattiḥ prakāśaḥ*)

For Naiyāyikas, etc.,<sup>(20)</sup> there is no separate thing called *prakāśa*, a property that one may attribute to cognition (*jñānasya dharmah*) or to its object (*jñeyasya dharmah*).<sup>(21)</sup> Rather, it is a mere occurrence of cognition (*jñānasyotpattiḥ*).<sup>(22)</sup> Remember that cognition is a specific quality of souls (*ātmavišeṣagaṇa*) for Naiyāyikas, etc. People have an illumination of blue when a cognition of blue occurs. In other words, what theorists call “an illumination of blue” is merely an occurrence of a cognition of blue.<sup>(23)</sup>

Similarly, an illumination of cognition<sub>1</sub> exists when people have cognition<sub>2</sub> of cognition<sub>1</sub>.<sup>(24)</sup> In other words, a subsequent cognition<sub>2</sub> called *anuvyavasāya* is required to grasp a previous cognition<sub>1</sub>. Cognition’s self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*) is impossible.

Thus, there is nothing independent called *prakāśa* that is to be attributed to cognition (*jñāna*) or to an object (*jñeya*).

Ratnākaraśānti refutes this view in the following manner. He says: “Even Brahmā cannot deny the evident fact that presently existent objects have illumination as their own nature.”<sup>(25)</sup> “If they have no illumination, even Indra cannot be aware of them.”<sup>(26)</sup> Even if a cognition occurred, its objects such as blue would remain unmanifest inasmuch as they are imperceptible without illumination.<sup>(27)</sup>

As shown above, for Naiyāyikas, etc., however, the illumination of an object is merely a cognition of an object and nothing more than that.<sup>(28)</sup> Therefore, it is not the case that an object has illumination as its own nature or property.

In response to this, Ratnākaraśānti points out the following difficulty: how can cognition, which is separate from an object, be a light for an object which itself is not luminous?<sup>(29)</sup>

<sup>(20)</sup> It is probably the case that *ādi* refers to Vaiśeṣikas.

<sup>(21)</sup> PPU: *nāyam uktalakṣaṇaḥ prakāśo jñeyasya jñānasya vā dharmah*.

<sup>(22)</sup> PPU: *kevalam sa bāhyasya viśayasya prakāśas tajñjānasyotpattiḥ*. Cf. NM I 218.15–16 (Ācāryāḥ): *jñānotpāda eva viśayasya pratyakṣateti no darśanam, na jñānagrahaṇam iti*.

<sup>(23)</sup> A soul and an object are connected by *saṃnikarṣa* via an *indriya* and the *manas*. Ratnākaraśānti does not mention connection here because he will discuss it in the next section when dealing with *apara*’s view.

<sup>(24)</sup> PPU: *jñānasyāpi prakāśas tajñjānotpattir eva*.

<sup>(25)</sup> PPU: *vidyamāneṣv artheṣv anubhavasiddhasya prakāśātmano brahmaṇāpi nikṣeptum aśakyatvāt*.

<sup>(26)</sup> PPU: *tadabhāve ca nīlādīsaṃvidāḥ śakreṇāpi kartum aśakyatvāt*.

<sup>(27)</sup> PPU: *jñānotpattāv api nīlādeḥ paroḥśātmanāparisphuṭa eva rūpe sthitatvāt*.

<sup>(28)</sup> PPU: *nanūktaṃ tad eva jñānam arthasya prakāśa iti*.

<sup>(29)</sup> PPU: *katham aprakāśamānasyaiva viprakṛṣṭaṃ jñānam prakāśaḥ*.

Naiyāyikas, etc., might object that a cognition becomes a light for an object because it “cuts out” (*paricchedāt*) the object, i.e., it is aware of the object.<sup>(30)</sup> This solution, however, does not work, because this *pariccheda* (cutting out, clipping, focusing, awareness) presupposes illumination. Without the illumination of an object, an object cannot be focused on.<sup>(31)</sup> Thus, one has to accept that an object has illumination as its property.<sup>(32)</sup>

And once this model, which is equal to the Bhāṭṭa view, is accepted, one can easily shift to the Buddhist view according to which objects such as blue are nothing but cognitions.<sup>(33)</sup> In other words, one can move to the view that illumination is the very nature of cognition and not a property of external objects.

### 3. The view of Mīmāṃsakāḥ: illumination (or cognized-ness) is a result of a cognizing action, i.e., a property produced in an object (B)

For Ratnākaraśānti, illumination is the very nature of all dharmas, whereas for Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas it is a produced property of a cognized object (*jñeyadharmā*). Ratnākaraśānti merely labels these opponents as Mīmāṃsakāḥ. According to these Mīmāṃsakas, illumination (*prakāśa*) or cognized-ness (*jñātatā*,<sup>(34)</sup> a term which Ratnākaraśānti does not mention here<sup>(35)</sup>), is not cognition in nature (*jñānātmā*), but a property of a grasped object (*viśayasya grāhyasya dharmāḥ*),<sup>(36)</sup> a property which is newly produced

<sup>(30)</sup> PPU: *paricchedād iti cet*.

<sup>(31)</sup> PPU: *katham aprakāśamānaḥ paricchidyate*.

<sup>(32)</sup> PPU: *kathaṃ na jñeyadharmāḥ prakāśaḥ*.

<sup>(33)</sup> PPU: *siddhe ca jñeyadharme 'rthe śeṣaṃ pūrvavat*.

<sup>(34)</sup> Sucaritamīśra prefers the term *jñānakarmatā* (*pratītau karmakārakatā, viśayatva*) to the old usage *jñātatā*, because the latter may be interpreted as *jñānaviśiṣṭatā*, which may cause a problem of mutual dependence between *jñāna* and *jñātatā*. ŚVK II 122.7–8: *yat tu jñānaviśiṣṭatā jñātateti. tan na. tatkarmatā hi sety uktam eva*. “On the other hand it is said that *jñātatā* (cognized-ness) is equal to *jñānaviśiṣṭatā*, i.e., the condition [of an object] being qualified by cognition. But this is not the case, because it was already stated that *jñātatā* is the condition [of a thing] being an object of cognition.” Ratnākaraśānti’s expression *viśayasya grāhyasya dharmāḥ* may reflect this phrase.

<sup>(35)</sup> Cf. NKaṇ 190.8–9: *tavāsau kalpitā tatsambandhitā, mama tu paramārthikī (paramārthikī) ES; pāramārthikī G*, *yam kila jñeyābhivyāptir (jñeyābhivyāptir) ES; jñeyābhivyaktir G iti jñātateti vā karmateti vācāryāḥ pracakṣate*;

BauTBh 18.1–7: *yat punar jñānasya paroḥsatvapratipādanāya bhāṭṭenoktam—“yathā ca rūpādi-prakāśānyathānupapattiyendriyasiddhiḥ, tathā jñānasyāpi siddhiḥ” iti. tathā hi tatra bhāṣyam—“na hi kaścīd ajñāte 'rthe buddhim upalabhate. jñāte tv anumānād avagacchati” iti. vārttikaṃ ca “tasya jñānaṃ tu jñātatāvaśāt” iti. jñātatā ca viśayapṛakāṭyam ucyate*. See Kajiyama 1966: 50–51 for translation and notes.

<sup>(36)</sup> Vācaspati’s view is slightly modified. NKaṇ 190.9–11: [Pūrvapakṣa:] *nanu karmateti ced iyam (ced iyam) ES; ceyam G* *arthadharmāḥ, katham (katham) ES; katham arthadharmo 'yam G* *atītādiṣu sambhvatīty uktam*. [Uttarapakṣa:] *neyam arthadharmāḥ, kiṃ tu jñātur ātmano*



by a cognizing action (*jñānakārya*).<sup>(37)</sup> In other words, when a soul cognizes blue, this action brings about a result, i.e., the illumination or cognized-ness, of blue.<sup>(38)</sup> Thus, blue comes to have the property called illumination, i.e., cognized-ness, as a result of a soul's action of cognizing.<sup>(39)</sup> To summarize: the cognizing action, which itself is imperceptible, causes illumination, i.e., cognized-ness, in an object; cognized-ness is perceptible, on the basis of which a cognizer postulates the existence of the imperceptible cognizing action.<sup>(40)</sup> In this way, for Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas an illumination is not a sentient cognition in nature but rather a property of an insentient object; and it is grasped by a soul.

**3.1.** Ratnākaraśānti refutes this view first by using the scheme of *kriyā* and *kāraṇa*, i.e., action and its accomplishing factors. He looks in particular at the instrumental cause (*karaṇa*) of an instance of awareness: What is the most effective cause of an instance of awareness? Only an object's condition of having the nature of being luminous (*prakāśātmatā*) can be the most effective cause. It functions as the particularity (*pratinīyatatā*) of an object by which a particular object such as blue (and not other objects

---

*jñeyasambandhabheda eva jñātātā.*

<sup>(37)</sup> PPU: *prakāśa ātmagrāhyam. tad asau siddha eva viśayasya grāhyasya dharmo jñānakāryaṃ na jñānātmā—iti mīmāṃsakāḥ.* “Mīmāṃsakas claim: (1) Illumination is an object to be grasped by a soul. (2) Therefore, it is well established as a property of a grasped object; (3) a result produced by a cognizing action; (4) and not cognition in nature.” Cf. ŚVK II 119:14–15: *ataḥ pratītikarmataiva saṃvidāḥ prakāśatepadārthaḥ “ghaṭaḥ prakāśate” itivat.* “Therefore, the word “shines forth (i.e. appears)” refers precisely to the [object’s] property of “being an object of the cognizing action of awareness,” just as it is the case for the expression “A pot appears.”“

<sup>(38)</sup> ŚVK II 124.10–12: *prāptiś cārthasyābhūtāpūrvāvasthā sarvasya svasaṃvedyety eke. anye tu hānādīvyavahārayogataivārthasya prāptir ity āvuh. saiva hi jñātātavam. tad eva hi jñānaphalam. kriyāphalabhāgitā ca karmātavam.* “And some people say that the fact that an object is attained [by a cognition] is a new condition that is self-evident for all. Others say that the fact that an object is attained [by a cognition] is precisely the property of an object being fit for [an agent’s] activity such as avoidance. For that alone is the property [of an object], i.e., cognized-ness. And the same thing is the result of a cognizing action. And [generally speaking] objectness is [defined as] the property of an object which has the result of an action.”

<sup>(39)</sup> Cf. ŚVK II 121.27–122.1: *tad yeyam arthasya pratītau karmakāraṇatā tad eva tasya viśayatvam, tac ca rūpaṃ pratīteḥ prāg abhūtaṃ parastān niṣpadyata ity avāśyam āśrayaṇīyam, anyathā jñātājñātayor aviśeṣāpatteh. tad eva jñātātādīpadāspadam jñānajñāne liṅgam.* “There, objectness of a thing is that it is an object-factor in a cognizing action. And this property, objectness, did not exist before cognition; it comes forth [only] after cognition. One must accept this, because otherwise it would result that there is no distinction between what is cognized and what is not cognized. That property alone, which is named *jñātātā* or the like is an inferential mark to cognize cognition.”

ŚVK II 124.4–5: *kimātmakaḥ punar arthastho dharmāḥ. uktaṃ karmakāraṇateti.* “[Q] What kind of nature does the property residing in an object have? [A] It was already stated that it is the property of being an object-factor.”

<sup>(40)</sup> For the abduction (*arthāpatti*) of cognition in the Bhāṭṭa school, see Ishimura 2015.

such as yellow) is established as being experienced.<sup>(41)</sup> Without this nature, i.e., particularity, an object cannot be experienced even in the presence of thousands of other factors (*kāraṅka*).<sup>(42)</sup> Therefore, blue's nature of being luminous (*prakāśātmatā*) alone is the final (*antya*) and distinguishing (*bhedaka*) factor, i.e., the most effective cause (*sādhakatama*) of an instance of awareness, and thereby can be regarded as the instrumental cause of an instance of awareness (*saṃvittau karaṇaṃ kārakam*).<sup>(43)</sup> Thus, one can designate this nature of being luminous (*prakāśātmatā*) as the cognizing instrument (*jñāna*, i.e., *jñānakaraṇa*), because an object is cognized by means of it.<sup>(44)</sup> In other words, *prakāśātmatā* (having illumination as its own nature) alone can function as the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) by means of which a particular object is cognized.

**3.2.** Alternatively, one can say that being luminous in nature (*prakāśātmatā*) itself is awareness, because blue, which is a cognition in nature, is cognized when blue shines forth. In other words, if one does not distinguish between *pramāṇa* and *pramā*, one can regard *prakāśātmatā* as equal to awareness, because when blue appears, what is happening there can be regarded as an event in which cognition is cognized (*jñānavijñāna*).<sup>(45)</sup> In other words, awareness of blue, in which blue shines forth, is self-awareness of cognition.

**3.3.** In both cases, regardless of whether or not one distinguishes between *pramāṇa* and *pramā*, all dharmas, such as colors and so on, are precisely cognitions in nature, i.e., they have illumination as their own nature,<sup>(46)</sup> because without *prakāśātmatā* there would be no way to establish the existence of cognition<sup>(47)</sup> and because when all factors are present only that alone is seen as occurrent.<sup>(48)</sup> In other words, *prakāśātmatā* alone is the epistemological evidence of cognition, and at the same time it is the ontological basis for it.

<sup>(41)</sup> Cognition's having a mental image in it (*sākāratva*) functions as *pramāṇa*, i.e., *vyavasthāpaka*. It brings about proper distinction of cognition according to its object (*pratīkarmavyavasthā* <PV 3.302d: *pratīkarma vibhajyate*). Cf. Tosaki 1979:397. See also PrP 174.1–3: *kiṃ ca nirākāratve prakāśasya pratīkarmavyavasthā nopapadyate. na hi tasya sarvārtheṣu kaścid viśeṣaḥ. arthākāratve tu "yasyākāro 'sau, tasya" iti ghaṭate pratīviśayavyavasthā.*

<sup>(42)</sup> PPU: *yataḥ prakāśātmatayaiva pratīniyatatayāmubhūyamānāyā nīlādi pratīniyatam anubhūtam sīdhyati, nainām antareṇa kāraṅkaśāntair api.* "For a particular blue, etc., can be established as the experienced object only by means of its being luminous in nature, i.e., particularity, which is being experienced. Without this [particularity] they cannot be established as such even by means of thousands of [other] accomplishing factors."

<sup>(43)</sup> PPU: *tasmād iyam evāntyatvena bhedakatvena ca sādhakatamatvāt saṃvittau karaṇaṃ kārakam.*

<sup>(44)</sup> PPU: *tasmād idam eva jñānaṃ yuktam "jñāyate 'nena" iti kṛtvā.*

<sup>(45)</sup> PPU: *saiva vā saṃvittir jñānam, jñānavijñānam iti kṛtvā.*

<sup>(46)</sup> PPU: *ubhayathā vijñānarūpā rūpādayaḥ sarvadharmāḥ siddhāḥ.*

<sup>(47)</sup> PPU: *tad antareṇa jñānasiddhau ca pramāṇābhāvāt.*

<sup>(48)</sup> PPU: *jñānakāraṇānāṃ ca saṃnidhau tasyaivotpattidarśanāt.*

### III. Ratnākaraśānti's strategy

#### 1. Narrower context

As the sequence of his discussion (B→C→D) shows, Ratnākaraśānti first refutes the view of (Bhāṭṭa) Mīmāṃsakas (B) that illumination is a property produced in a cognized object, i.e., the view that blue shines forth because it has illumination as its property as a result of a cognizing action. Refuting this view, he establishes his own view (A) that illumination is not a produced property of cognition (*jñānakārya*), but rather cognition in nature (*jñānātmā*), i.e., identical with cognition. His main argument is *prakāśātmatā*, i.e., blue's having illumination as its nature, which functions as the most efficient cause for the existence of the cognition of blue. In this way, in the first discussion he shifts from the view of property (B) to his own view of identity, i.e., the view that blue is a cognition in nature (A).<sup>49)</sup>

The second view, i.e., the view of Naiyāyikas, etc. (C), is worse than the Mīmāṃsā view for Ratnākaraśānti, because from the beginning they do not accept illumination as a separate category. For them, “blue appears” means “a cognition of blue arises” and nothing more than that. In other words, illumination is nothing more than the arising of a cognition (*jñānasyotpattiḥ*) for Naiyāyikas. So, the first thing Ratnākaraśānti has to do is convince the Naiyāyikas to accept illumination. Ratnākaraśānti argues first that illumination must be accepted as a property of an object (*jñeyadharmā*). In other words, he tries to persuade the Naiyāyikas (C) to adopt the Mīmāṃsā position (B). He explicitly mentions this move as follows: *siddhe ca jñeyadharme 'rthe śeṣaṃ pūrvavat*, once the thing in question, i.e., illumination, is established as a property of an object of cognition the rest will be the same as before, i.e., the previous argument against the (Bhāṭṭa) Mīmāṃsakas will stand. The last opponent is akin to Buddhists in that he accepts cognition as self-luminous. This view is more or less an ordinary view that we can accept as common sense, i.e., the view that an object, although itself non-luminous, is illuminated by the light of cognition. This view is further divided into three subclasses, i.e., the theories of *ekasāmagrī*, *viśayatva*, and *saṃsarga*, among which the third view seems to be the most representative one. According to this view, which can be named connection theory, an object is illuminated

<sup>49)</sup> A similar shift is found in Vācaspati's *Nyāyakaṇṭhikā* ad *Vidhiviveka* 2.4 (Goswami ed., 182.15–16): *na vijñānād anyo 'rthaprakāśaḥ. kiṃ tu vijñānaprakāśa eva saḥ. vijñānaprakāśaś ca vijñānam eva.* “Illumination of an object is not different from cognition, but rather it is precisely illumination of cognition; and illumination of cognition is precisely cognition.”

due to the connection with the illumination of cognition (*jñānaprakāśasamargāt*).

Against this view Ratnākaraśānti argues that an object must still be accepted as luminous in nature. The key-phrase is: \**aprakāśarūpo na prakāśate*,<sup>(50)</sup> nothing non-luminous in nature shines forth. In other words, he claims that what the opponent believes to be an insentient object (*jñeya*) is in fact a cognition in nature inasmuch as it must have illumination as its nature (*prakāśarūpa*).<sup>(51)</sup>

## 2. Wider context

### 2.1. Refutation of *nirākāravāda*

In these sections Ratnākaraśānti refutes (brahmanical) \**nirākāravādins*, i.e., Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas (B), Naiyāyikas, etc. (C), and *apara*, i.e., Prābhākaras (D),<sup>(52)</sup> and thus establishes the *sākāra* view that cognition has images (*ākāra*) in it. Here he focuses on the issue of whether blue, etc., are internal or external, as he states in his concluding remark in D.<sup>(53)</sup>

### 2.2. Refutation of the Sautrāntikas (E)

The *sākāra* view is shared by both Sautrāntikas and Yogācāras. Therefore, in the immediately following section (E) Ratnākaraśānti commences to refute the Sautrāntika view that an external object is grasped via its reflection (*arthapratibimba*).<sup>(54)</sup>

Here Ratnākaraśānti focuses on negating the existence of an external object that is to be grasped<sup>(55)</sup> so that he can establish that all dharmas are consciousness only (*viññaptimātra*) inasmuch as they are devoid of the *grāhya-grāhaka*-division.<sup>(56)</sup>

<sup>(50)</sup> The original sentence of PPU is: *sa ced atadrūpo na tarhi prakāśate*.

<sup>(51)</sup> A similar shift is found in Vācaspati's *Nyāyakaṇikā* (Goswami ed., 183.1–2): *tasmād ātmapara-prakāśanaparamārthaṃ vijñānam iti varṇayatā balād vijñānatādātmyaṃ nīlāder abhyupagataṃ bhavati*. “Therefore, a person who claims that cognition has as its true [nature] illumination of [cognition] itself and something else necessarily comes to accept that blue, etc., are identical with cognitions.”

<sup>(52)</sup> Prābhākaras hold the view of *nirākāra* although they accept self-awareness of cognition. See PrP 183–184.

<sup>(53)</sup> PPU: *tasmāt samvedyamānaḥ sarvo nīlādir jñānam eva, na jñānabāhyas tadgrāhyo 'rthaḥ*.

<sup>(54)</sup> PPU: *sautrāntikās tv āhuḥ. iṣṭam etad asmākaṃ sākāram eva naḥ sarvaṃ jñānam. kevalam asāv ākāro 'rthapratibimbaṃ yenārthena jñānadarpaṇe sākāśād ādhīyate so 'rthas tena jñānena samvedyate*. Ratnākaraśānti's method of epistemological critique of external reality in this section is based on Dignāga's *Alambanaparīkṣā*. (I thank Oki Kazufumi for his comment.)

<sup>(55)</sup> PPU: *tasmān nāsty eva grāhyo 'rthaḥ*.

<sup>(56)</sup> PPU: *ataś ca na kiṃcid grāhyam iti grāhakaṃ api na kiṃcit. tasmād grāhyagrāhakaśūnyaṃ*

### 2.3. Refutation of the reality of blue, etc.

#### 2.3.1. Refutation of the Vaibhāṣikas (F)

Immediately after this he starts refuting the Abhidharmic view of the eighteen *dhātus* (together with the twelve *āyatana*s and the five *skandhas*)<sup>(57)</sup> and he rejects the view that *rūpa* (color/form), etc., are real entities (*dravyasat*), by resorting in particular to the Yogācāra's well-known argument of neither-one-nor-many that shows the impossibility of atoms.<sup>(58)</sup> For Ratnākaraśānti they are simply false (*alīka*) and not real entities (*na vastu*).<sup>(59)</sup> This view can probably be ascribed to the Vaibhāṣikas, although Ratnākaraśānti does not mention their name.<sup>(60)</sup>

#### 2.3.2. Justification of his own view of *alīkaprakāśa*

If *skandhas*, etc., do not exist as Ratnākaraśānti claims, then how is their appearance (*tatpratibhāsa*) possible?<sup>(61)</sup> Ratnākaraśānti justifies his own view of *alīkaprakāśa*, i.e., the illumination of a false [image], by resorting to the idea that the mind (*citta*) is afflicted by residual impressions (*vāsanopahata*).<sup>(62)</sup> He also applies the logic of neither-one-nor-many

---

*viññaptimātram eva sarvadharmāḥ.*

<sup>(57)</sup> That Ratnākaraśānti examines those *dharma*s not accepted by Sautrāntikas suggests that his target is Vaibhāṣikas. His method of ontological critique of external reality is based on Vasubandhu's *Viṃśikā*. For the distinction between the epistemological proof and the ontological proof of *viññaptimātratā*, see Oki 1992. Cf. also ŚV *nirālambana* 17.

<sup>(58)</sup> PPU: *tato na rūpadhātuḥ kaścid eko 'neko vā*.

<sup>(59)</sup> PPU: *tasmād alīka evāyaṃ rūpadhātur na vastu*.

<sup>(60)</sup> The opponent in question seems to presuppose the *nirākāra* theory of the Vaibhāṣikas and not the *sākāra* theory of the Sautrāntikas when he states in PPU: *katham idānīm asatsu skandhādiṣu tatpratibhāsaḥ*. This view may be contrasted with Ratnākaraśānti's own view of the *sākāra* theory which is indicated by the expression: *tatpratibhāsasya viññānasyaiva*. Furthermore, Ratnākaraśānti's argument of *jñānasyākāraḥ* in the following section suggests that he has in mind *arthasyākāraḥ* in the present section. PPU: *sa caiṣa jñānasyāpy ākāro nīlādir alīka eva na vastu*. Here the particle *api* suggests that Ratnākaraśānti also claims: *arthasyākāro nīlādir alīka eva na vastu* and that he criticizes the opponent's view: *arthasyākāro vastu*.

<sup>(61)</sup> PPU: *katham idānīm asatsu skandhādiṣu tatpratibhāsaḥ*.

<sup>(62)</sup> PPU: *asatsv api teṣu tatpratibhāsasya viññānasyaiva vāsanopahatāc cittād utpatteḥ pūrvavat*. The expression *pūrvavat* refers back to the Sautrāntika section (E) in which Ratnākaraśānti replies to Sautrāntikas and states that *deśakālaniyama* is possible without external objects. PPU: [Sautrāntika:] *katham asatye 'rthe 'rthākāraṃ jñānaṃ deśakālaniyamaś ceti cet*. [Siddhānta:] *anarthe 'py anādyaparikalpanāvāsanopahatāc cittād deśakālaniyatārthapratibhāsajñānotpatteḥ*. It is better to take this *pūrvavat* as signifying the application of the same argument to the Vaibhāṣikas and not to the Sautrāntikas who were previously refuted.

to the internal images of a cognition and by implication rejects the view of \**satyākāravāda*, i.e., the view that internal images are real.<sup>(63)</sup>

### 2.3.3. Refutation of \**satyākāravāda* (G)

The previous section is immediately followed by Ratnākaraśānti's refutation of \**satyākāravādins*, whom he calls *sākārajñānavādins*.<sup>(64)</sup> Thus, we can better understand Ratnākaraśānti's intention behind placing the Vaibhāṣikas (F) after the Sautrāntikas (E). When introducing the Vaibhāṣika view, he focuses on the reality of blue. First, he refutes its reality as claimed in the "external" theory of the Vaibhāṣikas and then he refutes its reality as claimed in the "internal" theory of \**satyākāravādins*.

## 3. Context recapitulated

The synopsis of the relevant portions can be recapitulated as follows:

5.5.1. *sarvadharmāṇāṃ niḥsvabhāvatvam*

5.5.2. *sarvadharmāṇāṃ prakāśātmatā (sarvaṃ jñānaṃ sākāram)*

(1) Establishment of \**sākāravāda* (A)

(2) Refutation of \**nirākāravādas* (BCD)

5.5.3. Refutation of the Sautrāntika view (E) (*grāhyo 'rtho nāsty eva*)

5.5.4. Refutation of the reality of blue, etc. (either external or internal)

(1) Refutation of the Vaibhāṣika view of real *dhātus*, etc. (F)

(2) Justification of his own view that blue, etc., though false, appear

(3) Refutation of \**satyākāravāda* (G)

Ratnākaraśānti's ultimate goal is to establish his own view of *alīkprakāśa* (= *alīkasya prakāśaḥ*). To this end, he takes the following steps. He first proves that what shines forth (*prakāśamāna*) is an internal image (*ākāra*) and not an external object (5.5.2). Then he negates the existence of an external object that is to be grasped (5.5.3). Finally, he proves that what shines forth is unreal and false by refuting other views that hold that what shines forth is real (5.5.4):

5.5.2: whether cognition is *nirākāra* or *sākāra*

<sup>(63)</sup> PPU: *sa caiṣa jñānasyāpy ākāro nīlādir alīka eva na vastu, jñānātmakatve 'py ekatvānekatvavi-  
rahatādavasthyāt.*

<sup>(64)</sup> PPU: *kecīt tu yogācārāḥ kecīc ca mādhyaṃikāḥ sākārajñānavādīnas tad āhuḥ.*

5.5.3: whether or not an external object that is to be grasped exists

5.5.4: whether *prakāśamāna* (either external or internal) is *satya* or *alīka*

#### IV. Some remarks

1. The three heretic views can be attributed to Bhāṭṭas (B), Naiyāyikas, etc. (C), and probably Prābhākaras (D) respectively. B regards illumination as the property of a cognized object, whereas D regards it as residing in cognition.<sup>65</sup> C does not accept it as a separate category from the beginning.

2. Ratnākaraśānti first criticizes the three non-Buddhist views (BCD) and then the Sautrāntika view (E). This order suggests that in BCD he refutes *\*nirākāravādas* in order to establish *\*sākāravāda*, which is common to the Yogācāras and the Sautrāntikas (together with certain Mādhyamikas<sup>66</sup>).

3. Ratnākaraśānti's criticism of the Vaibhāṣika view (F) is placed after that of the Sautrāntika view (E) in order to establish his own view of "illumination of a false thing" (*alīkasya prakāśaḥ*) in opposition to "illumination of a real entity," the latter of which is either external (according to the Vaibhāṣikas) or internal (according to the *\*satyākāravādins* (G)).

#### Bibliography and abbreviations

##### Primary literature

JNĀ: *Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvalī*. Edited by Anantalal Thakur. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 21987.

NKaṇ: *Vidhiviveka of Śrī Maṇḍana Miśra with the Commentary Nyāyakaṇikā of Vācaspati Miśra*. Ed. Mahaprabhu Lal Goswami. Varanasi: Tara Printing Works, 1986. (The edition is designated as G; I thank Dr. Elliot Stern, who kindly allows me to consult his unpublished edition of the latter half of the *Nyāyakaṇikā*; his edition is designated as ES.)

NK: *Nyāyakandaḷī*. Ed. J.S. Jetly and Vasant G. Parikh. Vadodara: Oriental Institute, 1991.

<sup>65</sup> Ratnākaraśānti pays attention to the contrast between *jñeyasya dharmāḥ* and *jñānasya dharmāḥ* in the beginning of his criticism of the Naiyāyika view. PPU: [Naiyāyikādi:] *nāyam uktalakṣaṇaḥ prakāśo jñeyasya jñānasya vā dharmāḥ*.

<sup>66</sup> For the classification of Mādhyamikas, see Katsura's article in this volume.

- NM: *Nyāyamajñārī of Jayantabhaṭṭa*. Ed. K.S. Varadacharya. Mysore: Oriental Research Institute, 1969, 1983.
- PrP: *Prakaraṇa Pañcīkā of Śālikanātha Miśra with the Nyāya-siddhi of Jaipuri Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa*. Ed. A. Subrahmanya Sastri. Varanasi: Banaras Hindu University, 1961.
- PPU: *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa*. A critical edition being prepared by Luo Hong.
- BauTBh: *Tarkabhāṣā and Vādasthāna of Mokṣākaragupta and Jitūripāda*. Ed. H.R. Rangaswami Iyengar. Mysore: The Hindsthan Press, 1952.
- ŚV: *Ślokavārttika*. See ŚVK.
- ŚVK: *Mīmāṃsā Ślokavārtika with the Commentary Kasika of Sucaritamīśra*. Parts I & II. Edited by K. Sāmbaśiva Sāstrī. Trivandrum: CBH Publications, 1990.

### Secondary sources

- Ishimura, Suguru (石村克) 2015: 「靈魂の対象認識作用の存在が要請される理由について—スチャリタ・ミシュラの見解を中心に—」. A paper read at the 26th conference of West Japan Indian and Buddhist Studies held at Hiroshima University on July 25, 2015.
- Kajiyama, Yuichi (梶山 雄一) 1966: “An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy: An Annotated Translation of the Tarkabhāṣā of Mokṣākaragupta.” *Kyoto Daigaku Bungakubu Kenkyu Kiyō*, 10, 1–173.
- Oki, Kazufumi (沖和史) 1992: “Indo Daijō Bukkyō Shisō ni okeru Gaikai Jitsuzairon Hihan no Tokushoku.” In: *Bukkyō Mange: Shuchiin Daigaku Gakusha Shunkō Kinen Ronbunshū* (Nagatabunshōdō), 129–154.
- Tosaki, Hiromasa (戸崎 宏正) 1979: *Bukkyō Ninshikiron no Kenkyū (Jōkan)*. Tokyo: Daitō Shuppan-sha.

**keywords:** Ratnākaraśānti, prakāśa, saṃvitti, Mīmāṃsā